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Abstract 
The US. Vision for Space Exploration directs NASA to retire the Space Shuttle in 2010 and replace it 
with safe, reliable, and cost-effective space transportation systems for crew and cargo travel to the Moon, 
Mars, and beyond. Such emerging space transportation initiatives face massive organizational challenges, 
including building and nurturing an experienced, dedicated team with the right skills for the required 
tasks; allocating and tracking the fiscal capital invested in achieving technical progress against an 
integrated master schedule; and turning generated data into usehl knowledge that equips the team to 
design and develop superior products for customers and stakeholders. This paper discusses how NASA’s 
Exploration Launch Projects Office, which is responsible for delivering these new launch vehicles, 
integrates these resources to create an engineering business environment that promotes mission success. 
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The U.S. Vision for Space Exploration directs 
NASA to retire the Space Shuttle in 2010 and 
replace it with safe, reliable, and cost-effective 
space transportation systems for crew and cargo 
travel to the Moon, Mars, and beyond.‘ The Ares 
I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) that lofts the 
Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) into 
orbit early next decade is an in-line 
configuration with a Space Shuttle legacy 5-  
segment Reusable Solid Rocket Booster (RSRB) 
as the first stage and a new upper stage powered 
by a J-2X engine, an evolution &om the J-2 
engine used to power the upper stages of the 
Apollo Program’s Saturn IF3 and Saturn V, as 
shown in Figure 1. The heavy-lift Ares V Cargo 
Launch Vehicle (CaLV), seen in Figure 2, also 
builds on legacy hardware, consisting of two 
Reusable Solid Rocket Boosters and a Saturn- 
class core propulsion stage with five expendable 
RS-68 engines. Late next decade, the Ares V 
Earth Departure Stage, also powered by the J-2X 
engine, will carry the Lunar Surface Access 
Module to orbit to rendezvous with the Crew 
Exploration Vehicle and initiate the trans-lunar 
injection (TLI) burn to send the Crew 
Exploration Vehicle and lunar lander on toward 
the Moon. After arriving in lunar orbit, the crew 
will transfer to the lunar lander, which will 
transport them to and from the Moon’s surface 
while the Orion vehicle waits in orbit. After 
completing their mission, the astronauts will 
return to the crew capsule for the return trip to a 
landing on Earth. 
Figure 2. Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle. 
It has been more than 30 years since the Space 
Shuttle was designed; therefore, the current 
aerospace workforce has limited experience with 
developing new designs for human-rated 
spaceflight hardware. One risk reduction 
strategy NASA is employing is to build upon 
legacy systems (see Figure 3) and a foundation 
of extensive lessons learned fi-om Apollo-era 
veterans and Space Shuttle experts. 
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This paper focuses on the challenges of, and 
methods for, integrating the human, budget, and 
data capital used by the Exploration Launch 
Projects Office (also referred to in this paper as 
“the Ares team”) to fulfill the agency’s goals to 
return to the Moon and go beyond. 
igure 1. 
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To accomplish these activities, NASA uses a 
wide range of state-of-the-art information 
technology tools to connect its diverse, 
decentralized teams and to provide timely, 
accurate information for decision makers. In 
addition, business professionals are assisting 
technical managers with planning, tracking, and 
forecasting resource use against an integrated 
master schedule that horizontally and vertically 
interlinks hardware elements and milestone 
events. Furthermore, NASA is employing a wide 
variety of strategies to ensure that it has the 
motivated and qualified staff it needs for the 
tasks ahead. 
I. Human Capital 
Human capital is defined in this analysis as the 
people that make up the project team, with 
emphasis on the leadership team that manages 
the project team. The department of Industrial 
and Systems Engineering and Engineering 
Management at the University of Alabama in 
Huntsville has conducted extensive 
observational studies of teaming, focusing on 
eight team development characteristics 
identified by Carl Larson and Frank LaFasto.2 
These same characteristics have been used to 
assess the Ares project team. 
Larson and LaFasto define a team as having 
“two or more people; . . . a specific performance 
objective or a recognizable goal to be attained, 
and coordination of activity among the members 
of the team is required for attainment of the team 
goal or objective.” Without a doubt, the Ares 
project team meets these criteria. The eight 
principles for effective team performance are 
described below. Where applicable, this paper 
provides anecdotal evidence to confirm the 
presence of these characteristics within the Ares 
team. 
A. Clear, Elevating Goal 
Once the team is formed, it must identify a clear, 
concrete, significant mission for the individual 
members. This goal must be challenging and 
include a sense of urgency. 
It is clear that the ambitious U.S. Vision for 
Space Exploration fulfills this requirement, as it 
calls for: 
0 Returning the Space Shuttle to flight and 
completing the International Space 
Station by 20 10. 
Developing, testing, and flying a new 
Crew Exploration Vehicle by 2014. 
Returning to the Moon by 2020 and 
establishing an extended human 
presence there. 
Sending human missions to Mars and 
bey~nd .~  
0 
0 
0 
B. Results-driven Structure 
A team’s structure must include clear roles and 
accountability, an effective communication 
system, individual performance monitoring and 
feedback, and fact-based judgments. 
Furthermore, a team must be structured to 
accomplish the goal (or goals) it was created to 
achieve. The current team structure for the 
Exploration Launch Office is decentralized and 
broken down by major vehicle components, 
including the First Stage, Upper Stage, Upper 
Stage Engine, and Ares V Core Stage. Separate 
sub-teams have also been created for project 
planning and control (primarily business 
functions), vehicle integration, and flight testing 
(see Figure 4). The Vehicle Integration Office 
has the technical focus of ensuring that 
interfaces between all of the vehicle elements 
function properly, while the Flight and 
Integrated Test Office has the role of producing 
real-world data to validate the analytical design 
models. All of these teams must work together 
to achieve a crewed flight of the Orion to the 
International Space Station by 2014, with a 
developmental flight test as early as 2009. 
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Figure 4. Exploration Launch Projects Office organization. 
The team structure allows the Exploration 
Launch Projects team to design, develop, 
integrate, and test the vehicles in logical, self- 
contained units, as well to clearly delineate roles 
and responsibilities (see Figure 4). 
Communication occurs at all levels through 
electronic and face-to-face opportunities, as well 
as configuration control boards and interface 
working groups. Meetings include standing 
meetings of all interested personnel and smaller 
leadership meetings, weekly schedule reviews, 
all-hands gatherings and quarterly reviews, staff 
meetings, and topic-specific briefings and 
meetings. Furthermore, an organizational 
development expert personally assists project 
executives with self development and effective 
management approaches. 
NASA’s personnel system provides for typical 
performance feedback loops. Also, the teams 
resolve disputes by relying on strategies 
described in the book Crucial Conversations4, 
by Kerry Patterson, et al. 
A “crucial conversation” occurs when the 
operational and/or personal stakes of a situation 
are high, but individuals would usually seek to 
avoid the confrontation. The recommended 
strategies for conducting crucial conversations 
include: 
0 Focusing on individual and team goals 
and carefully considering what to say to 
achieve those goals. 
Being aware of body language and 
emotional responses that lead to crucial 
conversations. 
that will not escalate conflict. 
Observing and acting on the content and 
conditions of discussions. 
0 
0 Considering communication methods 
e 
NASA’s systems engineering approach5 guides 
engineering teams to use fact-based analysis for 
decision making. This is done via milestones in 
the development process. NASA’s program and 
project management approach6 ensures proper 
oversight via independent panels and bodies to 
validate the results of the engineering process. 
Table 1 describes the most critical internal fact- 
fmding reviews. 
4 
able SA project technica -
system Requirements Review 
P r e l i ~ n a ~  Design Review 
(PDW 
(CDW 
Critical Design Review 
Design Certification Review 
@CR) 
Flight Readiness Review 
(FRR) 
- -  - 
traceable, and that the hardware'and software are designed ahd built to the 
authorized baseline configuration. 
Provides completed design specifications, the identification and acquisition 
of long-lead items, manufacturhg plans, and life cycle cost estimates; the 
Discloses the complete system in full detail; asc 
problems and design anomalies have been resolved; and ensures that the 
design maturity justifies the decision to begin fabricatinghanufacturing, 
integration, and verification of mission hardware and software. The design is 
90 percent complete. 
Serves as the control gate that ensures that the system can accomplish its 
mission goals. Requirements are verified in a manner that supports launch 
operations. 
After the system has been configured for launch, the FRR process examines 
tests, demonstrations, analyses, and audits that determine the system's 
readiness for a safe and successful launch and for subsequent flight 
operations. The project manager and chief engineer certify that the system is 
ready for safe flight. 
managers must identify the necessary technical 
skills required to perform the job and select 
individuals who have the needed expertise. The 
Constellation Program is drawing from a 
nationwide pool of talent from within both 
Through its organization, communication 
methods, feedback and performance monitoring 
systems, and risk management reviews, the Ares 
team is positioned to achieve its goals. 
C. Competent Team Members 
In order to function properly, all teams must be 
composed of competent individuals with the 
appropriate skills. Program and project 
government and industry (Figure 5). The team 
members possessing these critical technical and 
personal interaction skills must achieve 
excellence while working well with others. 
-- . 
Figure 5. The Constellation Program integrates government and industry partners nationwide. 
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Serious thought also went into selecting the 
leadership team to assure competence was 
achieved vertically and horizontally across the 
organization. The Ares team capitalized on 
heritage experience &om the existing Space 
Shuttle team, and sought individuals with 
extensive project management expertise in 
propulsion projects. As the project has evolved 
over the past year, so, too, has the leadership 
team. 
D. Unified Commitment 
A unified group is one defined by intense 
identification with the team, while also 
demonstrating commitment and dedication to the 
endeavor. 
Identification with the team is sometimes 
difficult to assess, as participation in the Ares 
project requires membership in several teams, 
including the project team, element teams, 
leadership teams, technical teams, and so forth. 
Recently the Ares team has employed an 
organizational assessment survey, which will be 
repeated routinely to measure unified 
commitment and identification to the team (as 
well as several of the other principles described 
in this paper). 
E. Collaborative Environment 
Adjectives used to define a collaborative 
environment among the team include trust, 
integrity, openness (willingness to share and be 
receptive), consistency, and respect. 
Behaviors used to cultivate a collaborative 
environment include working the problem, using 
Crucial Conversations7, and applying agreed-to 
team norms (see Section H, Principled 
Leadership). The Ares team also provides many 
different forums for building trust through 
sharing information. Individuals raise concerns 
and ask questions at all-hands meetings and 
other working forums. In addition, the Ares team 
has a variety of methods for sharing information 
among team members, including a NASA 
intranet site and the agency-provided integrated 
collaborative environment (ICE) tool suite, 
which includes the Cradle requirements 
management tool and Windchill, NASA’s secure 
file server system, which maintains and protects 
information that is sensitive but unclassified or 
that is subject to International Traffic in A r m s  
Regulations (ITAR.). Maintaining this 
collaborative environment is easier when other 
principles (clear goal, competent team, etc.) are 
established first. 
F. Standards of Excellence 
Standards provide pressure to perform. They 
make a difference in team performance by 
setting expectations up front and providing a 
picture of what success should look like. 
Standards require hard work to attain and are 
easy to ignore. An effective team will exert 
pressure on itself to make changes that improve 
its own performance standards. 
The use of the organizational assessment survey 
discussed previously is another way of imposing 
standards on the Ares team because it lets 
everyone know if the group perceives that 
standards are being followed. Team norms, 
which will be discussed later, are also examples 
of the team’s commitment to standards of 
excellence. 
G. External Support and Recognition 
Both Marshall Space Flight Center’s 
management team and the Constellation 
Program management team have provided 
timely recognition and support to the Ares team, 
and to individuals within the team. Marshall’s 
Office of Strategic Analysis and 
Communications (OSAC) encourages internal 
and external support for the Ares project by 
disseminating key messages to stakeholders both 
inside and outside the agency through a variety 
of media, including Internet, intranet, internal 
newspapers, exhibits, e-mail messages, 
teleconferences, and live briefings. Through 
these messages, OSAC keeps NASA 
Headquarters and other governmental 
stakeholders, NASA employees, and the general 
public continually informed of the Ares mission, 
upcoming milestones, and progress. 
H. Principled Leadership 
Principled leadership can be seen as adherence 
to a dependable set of values and the 
communication of a consistent message. 
Principled leadership helps to keep individual 
egos in check and unleashes talent to do the 
work. Principled leadership fosters an open 
decision-making climate and enhances the 
individual team members’ ability to directly 
contribute to team choices, team risks, and team 
success. 
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These norms (see Table 2) are used to measure 
our performance and, without much effort, can 
be seen to individually or collectively represent 
Larson and LaFasto’s eight principles for 
effective teams. 
Table 2. Ares team norms. 
Have fun! 
o 
Teamwork is essential. 
o 
We are running a marathon, not a sprint, 
with a once in a career opportunity! 
“Our” instead of “my.” “We” instead of “I.” 
c‘Usyy rather than “me”. . . we’re all 
important. 
Integrity is expected. 
o Look each other straight in the eye, tell the 
truth, fkll disclosure. 
Not in 24/7 emergency mode all the time 
(there should be peaks and valleys). 
o Respect our families -healthy balance 
between work and family is important. 
Integration among the project and with 
partner organizations (e.g., Engineering, 
Safety & Mission Assurance, other 
centers) is essential. 
o Communicate, comrnunicate, communicate 
with each other. 
o Don’t wait on someone else to initiate. 
Believe the best about each other (assume 
no malicious intent). 
Constructive feedback leading to 
decisions (closure). 
Failure due to unknowns is acceptable - 
we learn from our mistakes. 
o Don’t worry about losing, think about 
We will hold each other accountable. 
EARLY identification and highlighting of 
issues. 
winning. 
As mentioned previously, the Ares team 
regularly deploys an organizational assessment 
tool to assess its adherence to these norms. 
In addition to establishing team norms, the Ares 
team must cope with change management issues, 
as f m e r  Space Shuttle engineers, managers, 
and other workers must make the transition from 
operating existing hardware to developing new 
hardware and processes on an ambitious 
timeline. To facilitate that transition and build 
teamwork, Ares team members have begun 
attending Shuttle Flight Readiness Reviews 
(FRRs) and sharing RSRB test data. 
The Ares team also is mindful of the 
management culture issues cited in the 
Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), 
which noted “Cultural traits and organizational 
practices detrimental to safety and reliability 
were allowed to develop [at NASA], including: 
reliance on past success as a substitute for sound 
engineering practices (such as testing to 
understand why systems were not performing in 
accordance with requirementshpecifications); 
organizational barriers which prevented 
effective communication of critical safety 
information and stifled professional differences 
of opinion; lack of integrated management 
across program elements; and the evolution of 
an informal chain of command and decision- 
making processes that operated outside the 
organization’s rules.y’8 
Throughout the project life cycle, requirements 
and decisions are monitored by the NASA 
engineering Technical Excellence (TE) program. 
TE is an agencywide effort to ensure that well- 
considered and sufficient technical thoroughness 
and rigor are applied to NASA programs and 
projects under an uncompromising commitment 
to safety. It directs that engineering 
organizations be independent from the programs 
and projects to which its representative is 
assigned. Technical authority is invested in the 
engineering organizations to control program 
and project technical requirements below the 
top-level goals. Technical authority includes 
both systems technical authorities working in 
partnership with a program or project, and 
discipline technical authorities working with 
specific discipline areas? 
A final means of managing human capital is 
through risk management. For instance, 
Exploration Launch Projects has put in place 
strategies to reduce the following risks”, which 
members of the Ares team are responsible for 
executing (Table 3). The risks cited impact cost, 
schedule, and performance, with schedule and 
performance ultimately impacting project cost 
and budget. 
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able 3. ~xp~oratiQn tigation strategies. 
might not be main&ined mioperated at a substantially 
reduced cost (compared to the Space Shuttle Program) 
because there is no requirement for Ares’ operations’ 
costs to be reduced. 
Ability of Ares I to Meet Performance Requirements 
- The Ares I team might not be able to main& the 
performance and margins needed to meet performance 
requirements. 
J-2X development schedule - Given the aggressive 
schedule for developing and testing the J-2X, the project 
might not meet the 2012 OFT flight dates. 
Requirements maturation - Stable top-level 
requirements may not be available in a manner to allow 
for successful and timely System Requirements Reviews 
and subsequent design cycles. 
Enhanced Flight Termination System (FTS) -NASA 
is considering decertifying the High Alphabet Receivers, 
the current skill availability, mix, and culture in NASA’s 
work force, the team may not be able to execute the 
project in a timely manner. 
Fault tolerance requirements - The Ares I Human 
Rating Plan has nocbeen approved and the vehicle’s 
mass, cost, and schedule are uncertain until flight test 
requirements are agreed to and baselined. Therefore, 
trades and requirements might not be updated in a timely 
manner to support the design and development cycle. 
Vehicle controllability - There might be some vehicle 
control issues that prevent a successful flight due to 
concerns with increased stack length and associated 
dynamic response. 
Inability to meet Earth Departure Stage (EDS) 
loitering time requirement - Given the 100-day 
loitering time requirement, the EDS might not be able to 
deliver the required 66 metric tons of payload to TLI. 
Ability of heritage hardware to meet new Ares I 
requirements - Given the new ascendre-entry loads, 
vibration and acoustic environments associated with 
Ares I, the SRB heritage hardware might not meet 
qualification requirements, resulting in cost and schedule 
impacts due to redesign andor requalification efforts. 
The ultimate end of the Ares team’s Human 
Capital management efforts is to have the right 
people in the right places with the right tools to 
build the safe, reliable vehicles that will take the 
Work with the Constellation program to develop a 
requirement for launch vehicle operations costs. After 
cost targets are established, identify and prioritize 
operability factors and incorporate them into the launch 
vehicle design. 
Establish and document the performance margin and 
mass allocation processes. Conduct design analysis 
cycled to determine shortfalls. Work with Ares element 
offices to increase Derformance and reduce mass. 
Work with the prime contractor to develop the integrated 
master schedule and engine system development plan. 
This includes identifying risks and associated mitigation 
Identi@ and prioritize Constellation and Ares System 
Requirement Review schedules to allow time for 
successful requirements development. 
Determine new FTS requirements to be incorporated 
into the design. Draft integrated master schedule and 
identify any major schedule sensitivities. 
Determine skill availability and implement staffing 
activities to align with project life cycle. 
plans. 
Use reliability models to understand where critical 
failure modes are in A R E S  I and work with element 
offices to identify rationales for any deviations. 
Perform wind tunnel test, high-fidelity modeling of stack 
dynamics, and analysis of stack to identify vehicle 
controllability issues. Size reaction control system and 
vehicle structures accordingly. 
Work with Constellation program to determine loitering 
requirements and conduct design analysis cycles once 
requirements are set. Perfom Vehicle Integrated 
Performance Assessment of CaLV. 
IdentLfy and quantify the environments and loads to for 
Ares I. Assess differences and required design changes. 
11. Budget Capital 
U.S. and international partner astronauts to the 
Moon, Mars, and beyond. 
The Constellation Program initially adopted the 
Exploration Systems Architecture Study 
recommendations as the point of departure for 
8 
developing crew transportation to the 
International Space Station, the Moon, and 
Mars. The Exploration Launch Projects (ELP) 
Office was established at Marshall in September 
2005, and began its formulation phase in 
October 2005. 
As stated in NASA’s Exploration System 
Architecture Study Final Report, “It is 
anticipated that the concepts [recommended] 
will be analyzed further and refined. By the time 
some of the activities addressed are 
implemented, certain assumptions on which the 
report’s conclusions are based will likely evolve 
based on this new analysis.”” 
Subsequent to the Exploration Systems 
Architecture Study, trade studies were 
commissioned by NASA Headquarters and the 
Exploration Systems Mission Directorate’s 
Constellation Program in early 2006 to select a 
space transportation architecture that could 
deliver critical transportation elements required 
for an earlier Moon mission, yet stay within 
budget caps and acceptable risk positions. The 
Exploration Launch Projects Office conducted 
system analyses, and formulated schedule and 
cost models to determine if, and how, Crew 
Exploration Vehicle and Ares I designs could be 
re-phased to accommodate hardware changes 
while staying within the agency’s relatively flat 
spending limits. 
Three alternatives for the Ares I Upper Stage 
were considered during the Study: a single 
expendable version of the Space Shuttle Main 
Engine, a pair of J-2s engines that are 
derivatives of the 5-2 engine flown on the Saturn 
V launch vehicle’s S-II and S-TVB stages, or a 
cluster of four new expander engines. The Study 
group preferred the Space Shuttle Main Engine 
(RS-25)--redesigned to be an expendable 
variant-for its long performance history and 
proposed commonality with the Ares V, which 
was going to use the Shuttle Main Engine on its 
Core Stage.” The Earth Departure Stage would 
use two J-2s engines. 
In January 2006, the agency streamlined its 
hardware development approach for Vision for 
Space Exploration launch vehicles based on the 
results of systems engineering trade studies 
conducted in tandem with independent cost 
estimating and acquisition planning. The first 
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stage of the evolved Ares I configuration is a 5- 
segment Reusable Solid Rocket Booster using 
polybutadiene acrylonitrile (PBAN) propellant. 
The J-2 design was a human-rated engine 
capable of restarting in flight, something the 
Space Shuttle Main Engine was not designed to 
do. Because of these features, the Ares I upper 
stage and Ares V Earth Departure Stage use a 
single J-2X engine (as shown in Figure 6).  This 
change retires the RS-25 air-start modification 
risk. 
Figure 6. The Ares V Earth Departure Stage, 
docked with the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle, 
prepares to ignite its J-2X engine for the trans- 
lunar injection burn toward the Moon. 
Costs and the steep investment ramp-up after 
20 10 are reduced by increasing up-front 
investments in propulsion design, development, 
test, and evaluation. The Ares team also adjusted 
its development approach, resulting in a more 
sustainable funding profile across multiple 
Government administrations. 
By developing common Ares I and Ares V 
propulsion systems, the Ares team also will be 
using common manufacturing facilities, ground 
support systems, and launch infkastructure 
modifications and improvements, thereby 
reducing both recurring and nonrecurring 
operations costs throughout each system’s life 
cycle. 
The Ares I System Requirements Review (SRR) 
planned for 2006, is focused on thoroughly 
understanding agency, prograq and project 
requirements related to technical performance, 
target milestones, and budget allocations before 
beginning the implementation phase leading to 
the Preliminary Design Review and Critical 
Design Review. The SRR process also identifies 
and reduces risks to mission success. 
All of these planning and study activities have a 
direct impact on the Program’s current and 
fbture budget. The budget process for supporting 
the Exploration Launch Office is consistent with 
and integral to the agency’s and center’s budget 
processes. The hardware elements’ business 
managers have primary responsibility for the 
development, analysis, review, and coordination 
of their respective budgets. All Exploration 
Launch Projects budget exercises are initiated 
and governed by requirements as specified in 
written guidelines specific to each budget call, 
as issued by NASA Headquarters, Constellation 
Program, and the Marshall Center’s Chief 
Financial Officer. 
The Ares team uses the following program 
controls to ensure that it operates according to 
plan, on budget and on schedule. 
A. Monthlv Status 
Monthly status checks are in place within the 
Project Planning and Control Office of 
Exploration Launch Project to brief Project 
Management, Marshall Management, and 
Constellation Program Management on Ares I 
programmatics including schedule, budget, and 
personnel. 
The Ares I element offices-i.e., those offices 
charged with developing the various vehicle 
components such as the First Stage, Upper 
Stage, and J-2X engine-are required to present 
a monthly report to the Project Planning and 
Control manager. This report includes graphical 
and bulletized presentations of status of actual 
versus planned progress for obligations, costs, 
manpower, and major procurements. The report 
includes the element’s top risks and schedule, as 
approved by element-level control boards, and a 
list of accomplishmaits for the previous month 
and any issues or concerns. 
These reviews are separate fiom the program 
milestone reviews, such as the System 
Requirements Review or Preliminary Design 
Review. 
B. Earned Value Management 
NASA continues to be a pioneer in using Earned 
Value Management (EVM) to monitor and 
control costs. Put simply, Earned Value 
Management is an integrated management 
control system for assessing, understanding, and 
quantifying what a contractor or field activity is 
achieving with allocated  dollar^.'^ EVM helps 
predict future performance based on trends.14 It 
makes these predictions by comparing the 
planned amount of work with what has actually 
been completed (“earned”), to determine if the 
cost, schedule, and work accomplished are 
progressing in accordance with the plan. 
EVM provides an integrated method for 
ensuring that the Ares program continues 
operating in a manner that is both technically 
proficient and financially efficient, measuring 
progress for both against a baseline. 
Additionally, on a more tactical level and in 
keeping with the Earned Value Management 
strategy, the Ares project is integrating full-cost 
accounting (FCA) into its budget process by 
actively tracking when dollars are actually spent 
on products and ser~ices.’~ This ensures that 
NASA Headquarters receives regular, accurate, 
and up-to-date information on when and how 
money is spent. 
As part of the Earned Value Management 
strategy, the Ares team is developing thorough 
program plans early in the program. In 
connection with these program plans, the Ares 
team must create, maintain, and update data 
related to technical and financial plans carefully, 
making project data a capital asset item unto 
itself. 
111. Data Capital 
A. Transforming Data into Knowledge 
1. Gathering and Validating Requirements 
Although the overarching philosophy to achieve 
the goals and objectives of the U.S. Vision for 
Space Exploration includes using legacy systems 
to the greatest extent possible, space launch 
systems continue to remain complex. However, 
new elements also will be required in the new 
designs, creating new systems integration 
challenges for the agency. 
NASA's product validation process is used to 
confirm that a verified end product generated by 
product implementation or product integration 
llfills (satisfies) its intended use when placed in 
its intended environment and ensure that any 
anomalies discovered during validation are 
appropriately resolved prior to delivery of the 
product.I6 
The process for validating system requirements 
begins at the top level-in this case, with the 
Vision expressing the goal of the customer (the 
administration and, ultimately, the voting 
public), which is to send human beings to the 
Moon, Mars, and other destinations. NASA's 
systems engineering process then derives and 
validates an increasingly specific set of 
requirements to fulfill those goals, fiom the 
overall mission down to the systems, 
subsystems, and ultimately component 1e~el . l~  
The Ares launch vehicles present a complex 
systems integration challenge, as they result 
fi-om designs using both heritage and new flight 
hardware. This demands a new level of technical 
design and development discipline. Ares I and 
Ares V integration also includes incorporating 
various payloads and interfacing with a number 
of logistical applications-fi-om manufacturing 
and processing, to shipping, testing, and 
launching." 
After the requirements are validated and as the 
product is developed, the product verification 
process is used to demonstrate that an end 
product generated fiom product implementation 
or product integration conforms to its original 
design solution definition  requirement^.'^ 
The ultimate aim of the validation and 
verification P&V) process is to ensure that the 
customers receive the product they want and that 
the product delivered fulfills those requirements 
in a satisfactory manner. Figure 7 depicts the 
steps that the Ares team uses as part of its V&V 
process. 
Figure 7. The Ares team's cycle of verification and 
validation. 
2. Idormation Technology and Engineering Tools 
The Ares team uses a variety of information 
technology and engineering tools to validate and 
verify requirements as well as to integrate the 
design and development of its launch vehicles. 
For instance, to develop credible designs, the 
team uses a number of innovative, tailored tools 
to mine information fi-om past databases, 
including the Integrated Rocket Sizing 
(INTROS) application, which is a launch vehicle 
design and sizing model used to assess advanced 
concepts. 
The launch vehicle design developed in 
INTROS provides a basis for M e r  analysis by 
the Launch Vehicles Analysis (LVA) program, 
which is a stand-alone application that provides 
extremely fast structural design and analysis. 
One of the most sophisticated tools the Ares 
team uses is the modeling and simulation 
capability provided by Virtual Integrated 
Performance Analysis (VIPA), which provides 
valuable data about machinehachine interface 
and humadmachine interactions by allowing a 
subject to interact with a computer-aided design 
(CAD) animation. 
The VIPA capability projects a two-dimensional 
world into a virtual three-dimensional space, 
where the operator can interact with the design 
drawing. In addition to using new design tools, 
the Ares team is incorporating lessons learned 
and best practices from previous NASA space 
launch endeavors, including Department of 
Defense and industry programs. 
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and ReciuirementdS ystems Engineering 
Processes and Requirements 
1. Requirements Develoument Remonsibilities 
The Exploration Systems Mission Directorate’s 
Constellation Program is responsible for 
baselining the architecture as defined by the 
Exploration Systems Architecture Study and 
identifymg a furst-tier, mission-level set of 
requirements. 
The Exploration Launch Projects Office is 
responsible for developing the next level of 
requirements for Earth-to-orbit and lunar 
transfer capabilities associated with the selected 
Ares I and Ares V architectures. The 
Constellation Program and Exploration Launch 
Projects will implement the processes and 
systems for performing, supporting, evaluating, 
and refocusing NASA’s systems engineering 
procedures and guidelines. 
The Exploration Launch Projects Office is 
developing the requirements for its architecture 
elements and will manage the design and 
development of these components and 
subsystems. 
A proven, classical systems engineering 
approach has been tailored and incorporated by 
the Constellation Program to support the unique 
requirements, design, manufacturing, testing, 
and verification and validation activities 
performed by multidisciplinary teams under 
NASA’s guidelines for both the Ares I and Ares 
V Launch Vehicle Projects. The mission-level 
engineering effort must employ a rigorous 
systems engineering process that ensures 
successful integration from component to 
subsystem, system, and, fmlly, to the overall 
mission level. 
2. Usinn the Provide Aerospace Products and 
Capabilities (PAPAC) Process 
In concert with the Exploration Systems Mission 
Directorate, the Constellation Program Manager, 
a€ong with customers and stakeholders, defines a 
validated set of first-tier requirements derived 
from the Vision’s goals and objectives, which 
are then distributed by the Constellation 
Program to its subordinate organizations. 
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More specifically, project-level requirements are 
developed by the Exploration Launch Projects, 
which will further drive the development of 
component-level requirements for both the Ares 
I and Ares V. Once baselined, these 
requirements will be closely tracked throughout 
the project’s lifetime through the Provide 
Aerospace Products and Capabilities proces+ 
from formulation and approval to 
implementation (see Figure 8). 
1 
APPROVAL 
tal 1 IMPLEMENTATION 
4 NASA Customers and Stakeholders 
Figure 8. Interrelationships of the Provide 
Aerospace Products and Capabilities 
sub-processes. 
3. Formulating Requirements and Plans 
The goal of the formulation sub-process is to 
develop a program or project concept with 
requirements leading to a defined plan, which is 
implemented to meet mission objectives. The 
Constellation Program Plan and associated 
project plans are products of the formulation 
process, which will establish the guidelines for 
achieving the mission set forth in the Vision. 
4. blementinp the Plans 
Following the formulation process, the 
Exploration Launch Projects Office will be 
evaluated for authority to proceed fiom 
formulation to implementation. 
The products of this process include an approved 
Program Commitment Agreement, as well as 
project plans, which will include revisions based 
on safety (risk), budgetary, technical, or strategic 
redirection. 
Implementation is the execution phase of 
Constellation’s projects. The implementation 
process shall deliver program and project 
products and capabilities that meet the 
customer’s needs within approved resources. 
5. Evaluating Execution 
Finally, the evaluation process provides an 
independent assessment of the project team’s 
ability to meet its technical and programmatic 
commitments. The evaluation process will 
ensure the benefits of peer experiences and 
provide opportunities for customer participation. 
Evaluation occurs throughout the project to 
ensure the successful completion of the 
formulation, approval, and implementation sub- 
processes. The evaluation process also provides 
recommendations for proceeding with, 
modifying, or terminating the project. 
The Cost Analysis Data Requirement (CADRe) 
is a comprehensive document that provides a 
technical and quantitative description of the 
project in terms that permit a Life Cycle Cost 
Estimate (LCCE) to be developed. The project 
team develops and configuration-controls the 
CADRe. Typically, the contractor andor NASA 
project engineers, assisted by cost estimators and 
the Marshall Office of Strategic Analysis and 
Communication, construct the CADRe. The 
CADRe should be considered a “living 
document” that is matured at major milestones. 
Through its systems engineering processes and 
collaborative software tools, the Ares team is 
able to carefully validate, verify, and deliver the 
Ares launch vehicles that fulfill the 
requirements. The data obtained in the 
development process also feed into the team’s 
cost estimates, ensuring that the vehicles are 
being built according to the original technical, 
budget, and schedule requirements. The human 
capital assets of the team, together with the data 
they obtain, will provide the necessary 
intellectual capital and creative synergy needed 
to put the Ares launch vehicles on a path to the 
stars. 
IV. Summary 
The Exploration Launch Vehicles Project Office 
has made significant strides in its goal to field 
the Ares I and Ares V vehicles per the timeline 
outlined by the U.S. Vision for Space 
Exploration. The challenges of integrating and 
managing the human, budget, and data capital of 
the project are daunting considering the span of 
project control and required depth of 
understanding. The leadership team is 
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committed to working these problems on a daily 
basis to enable the element team5 to achieve the 
strategic goals and objectives set forth in the 
Vision. 
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